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Abstract 
This paper analyses exchange rate management in a simple overlapping 
generations model. This framework i~ used to evaluate alternative policies 
in terms of their implications for the welfare of individuals in the economy. 
The analysis identifies two objectives of monetary policy, providing a 
desirable store of value and collecting seigniorage. When the chief concern 
is to provide a desirable store of value (as when the monetary authority's 
major constituency consists of the asset holders of the economy), a policy 
of fixing the exchange rate does better when shocks are primarily of foreign 
origin while floating becomes more desirable when domestic shocks predominate. 
When seigniorage concerns are paramount (as when the authority's constituency 
is the yoQilg generation) flexible rates do better.- When seigniorage concerns 
are paramount and when the monetary authority cannot establish a reputation 
• for conducting monetary policy in a way that makes the currency a desirable 
store of value, a national currency may not be viable in the absence of exchange 
controls. Such controls may be justified in this situation. 
1 
1. Introduction 
The design of monetary policy and exchange rate management is a topic 
that bas received considerable attention in the last five years. Papers by 
Buiter (1979), Turnovsky (1982), Buiter and Eaton (1980), Flood and liarion 
(1982), Eaton and Tumovsky (1980) and Frenkel and Aizenmari (1981) are 
examples of models that consider the optimality of alternative stabilization rules. 
The models used to evaluate alternative monetary and exchange rate policies 
and to derive optimal policies suffer from four deficiencies that this paper 
. attempts to address. 
First, models are constructed on the basis of a number of aggregate macro­
economic relationships that are not derived from underlying preferences and 
technologies. Their usefulness for policy evaluation is therefore questio~able 
for the reason 1;iven by Lucas (1976): changes in policy may lead to changes in 
these aggregate ,:-elationships. Output supply.and asset demands are examples of 
functional relationships that may be sensitive to policy changes. 1 
Second, policy evaluation is based upon ad hoc objective functions of the,--.. --
. government rath,.!r- than upon a comparison of the welfare of individuals in the. .
economy under alternative policies. Assuming that the government is responsive 
to the welfare of its citizens, its policy objectives should derive from the 
preferences of individuals in the economy. When individual objective functions 
are specified alternative policies can then b~ evaluated in terms of their 
effects on individuals' utilities. 
Third, discussion of optimal monetary policy in open economies has typically 
ignored the role of national monies in generating seigniorage for their govern­
ments. Fischer (1982) has recently discussed seigniorage as an objective ~f 
1this point is raised by Flood and Marion (1982), although they do.not specifya model derived from the optimizing behavior of individuals. 
monetary policy but provides no formal analysis. In fact, in some countries 
aeigniorage constitutes a major source of revenue, possibly because it con­
atitutes the administratively least expensive and least distortionary form 
of taxation. 
Fourth, optimal policies are typically derived from the class of closed 
~ loop policies. As Kydlartd and Prescott (1977) have emphasized, such policies 
may not be time consistent. For many of the ~odels discussed above the 
2optimal closed loop and optimal feedback policies coincide. Once seigniorage 
considerations are introduced, however, they diverge. 
This paper develops a model of an open economy derivative of the Samue:son 
_(1958) pure consumption loan model. Individuals have available to them as e 
store of value a foreign currency which depreciates in value at a stochastic 
rate that is exogenous to the economy under consideration. The population 
growth rate of this economy is also an exogenous stochastic process. 
The government of this economy has the ability to provide its own currc~cy 
as a store of value. Individuals choose their first period consumption and 
allocate their savings between_the two currencies to maximize the expected 
uti~ity of 'consumption oyer two periods. There is no individual bequest motive. 
Rew money issue is used to finance government expenditure which is assumed to 
benefit only the younger generation. 
Bringing the economy toward the Golden Rule and generating seigniorage 
constitute two major goals of monetary policy. Providing a relatively riskless 
atore of value and a stable source of seigniorage are two additional goals. The 
objectives of monetary policy to provide a desirable store of value and to generate 
a atable source of revenue for public expenditure are in sharp conflict in the 
abort run but may be more compatible in the long run. 
When the primary objective of the monetary authority is to provide a 
desirable store of value, one insight of the previous literature 
2see Kydland (1977) for a discussion of the distinction between closed loop and
feedback policies. See Calvo (1978) for a discussion of optimal and time con­aistent monetary policies in a non-stochastic closed economy context. 
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reemerges: a policy of predetermining the exchange rate each period tends 
to yield higher welfare when the domestic price level is stable relative 
to the domestic growth rate and conversely. A policy of having no national 
currency at all, relying solely upon the foreign currency as a store of 
value, can in some circumstances dominate a policy of having a currency 
fixed in value in terms of the foreign currency or freely floating against 
it. When the primary function of the monetary authority is to generate 
- seigniorage, however, a policy of pure floating always dominates a fixed 
exchange rate policy or a policy of having no national currency. 
When seigniorage considerations are present, a government that attempts 
to maxirni.ze the welfare only of the current yo~ug generation cannot sustain 
a currency. ~he only time consistent policy leads to a no~.monetary economy. 
Introducing the expected utility of future generations as a public good can 
reverse this result, however. Alternatively, when earning seigniorage is not 
an objective, time consistent policy can correspond to the optimal closed 
loop policy!• 
Section 2 derives the optimal savings and portfolio behavior of each 
ato-wistic :uuUvidual in the economy' under cons:i.deration. Section 3 imbeds 
this behavior in a simple, aggregate model to derive the behavior of the 
domestic price level and the exchange rate as functions of exogenous vari­
ables and policy parameters. The expected welfare of each generation in a 
nonmonetary economy is derived in section 4, and is compared with expected 
welfare under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes for a monetary economy. 
Section 5 considers optimal feedback policies u~der alternative social welfare 
and individual utility functions. Section 6 discusses the role of reputation 
as a means of enforcing a monetary economy and the optimal closed loop policy. 
Some concluding remarks appear in section 7. 
4 
2. Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Behavior 
Consider an economy of the Samuelson (1958) pure consumption loan 
-variety. Individuals live two periods, earning an amount Yin the first 
period of their lives and nothing ~n the second period. An individual 
1 entering the labor force in period t seeks to maximize a utility function 
of the form: 
log c1Y + B log cio + ti) G (2.1)
t t + 1 t 
where c1i denotes i's consumption in the working period, c!0+ 1 in the retire­
ment period, and Gt denotes per worker government spending in the working 
period. Individuals are assumed not to derive utility from government spend­
ing in their retirement period. The parameter w indicates the weight placed 
on government spending relative to private consumption. 
Individuals have available to them as stores of value a domestic money 
. 
and a foreign money. There is a single trade4 good_ the price of which, in 
period t, is Pt in terms of domestic money.and Pt* in terms of foreign money. 
_Exact purchasing· power parity (PPP) obtains so that 
(2.2) 
w'"here E~ denote~ the The country.. 
under consideration is small in the sense that domestic actions do not affect 
* * Pt. The role of inflation in terms of the foreign price level is nt so that 
(2.3) 
where 
* P*n + \;.-
t 
* P*Beren is a constant and ut a Gaussian white noise process with variance 








Here n is a constant and ut a Gaussian white noise process with variance ap. 
The next section derives this process for the domestic price from the under­
lying macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy. 
No voluntary intergenerational transfers take place. The two monies 
provide the only assets to transfer income from the working period to the 
retirement period. During the working period individual 1 thus chooses Ci~ 
and divides his wealth between the two monies to maximize expected lifetime 
1utility. Let At denote individual i's share oi wealth allocated toward the 
foreign money. Thus 
x! - .. (1 (2.5)p 
. t ... 
(2.6) 
. i *i
where~ and Mt denote individual i's.holdings of domestic and foreign 
money respectively. We assume that neither money can be held in negative 
amounts. Thus Y - ~~ A! and 1 - A! must be nonnegative. 
io
Consumption in retirement, Ct+ 1 , is given by 
(2. 7) 
6 




2 are sufficiently small 
to ignore the products of any two of them the processes (2.3) and (2.4) may 
be approximated by 
"' pPt/Pt+ l • 1 - n - ut (2.8) 
* * '\, * P*Pt/Pt+ l • 1 -n - u t (2.9) 
Combining (2.8) and (2.9) with the PPP relationship (2.2) gives 
"' *E./E +lml+n-n +uP -uP* * et t El+n-n +u (2.10)·. t t t 
eBere ut is the implied error term in the change in Et. A second-order Taylor 
io · - iyaeries approximation of the expectation of log Ct+ 1 around log (Y - Ct), 
using (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10) is 
io "' - iy 1Ji; [ log ct+ i]"" log (Y - c t) + [- n + >.t(n - Il*)] 
_. [a 2 + o.1)2a tv,ia .,J,
p t e t-ep/" (2.11) 
where a
e
2 is the variance of uet and a
~ 
the covariance between ue
t 
and upt" 
Substituting (2.11) into (2.1) and maximizing the resulting expression with 




At these values i~dividual 1 attains an expected level of utility • 
..,;n - 1/2 a2 if A! .. 0 1
_ p cn-n• + a >2 - n - n• + a




2ep 1 + wG tif At• 2 epj 
e ae 
. 2 1n• - 1/2 a if A, • 1
pie ~ 
where 
p - B log S (1 + B) log (1 + B) 
-y =log Y 
'this section has characterized the optimal consumption and portfolio 
behavior of a single individual facing a given level of government spending 
and distributions·of the foreign and domestic price levels and the exchange 
rate. The next section derives the level of government spending and the 
behavior of the domestic price level and exchange rate from aggregate 
characteristics of the economy and from government policy. 
I 
8 
3. The Aggregate Economy 
Since all individuals earn the same income and face the same distri­




while the aggregate consumption of the working generation C~ is 
(3.2) 
where Lt is the number of workers entering the labor force in period t. 
The number of workers entering the labor force in period tis (1 + nt) 
times the number that entered the previous period, i.e., 
Lt • (1 + nt) Lt - 1 
where (3.3) 
.. 
n 2Here n is a constant and ut a Gauss~an white noise process with variance C1 • n 
. n P* . 
Assume tliat u and u are uncorrelated. . . . t . t .. 






. New monetary issue is used to finance government spending. There are no 
3
other sources of government revenue. Thus 
M -1
t - 1 [(l + n) L] (3.5)t t
pt -7 1 
Gt thus ~onstitutes total seigniorage gleaned in period t. 
Following much of the previous literature on exchange rate intervention 
this model assum~s that the only contemporaneous variable that the government 
observes is the exchange rate. (See, ~.g., Buiter (1979), Turnovsky U982), 
Buiter and Eaton (1980), Eaton and Turnovsky (1980), Frenkel and Aizenman (i9s1)). 
· On the basis of information available at the end of the previous period the 
government sets a monetary growth rate g~ that is subject to revision in 
response to new information embodied in the exchange rate. The actual money 










-.wne.. - ..... ~- ..t, .. :.::.;;___ , i_ s..-e unan1;:1.c_pa1;e_ componen 
h t de ..----11 .1 .. ..h ._.1 i .. d t: of the exc ange ra e an at 
a policy parameter. Setting at -= 0 corresponds to a regime of pure floating 
·while the exchange rate is fixed within the period when a = - ~. It is assumed thatt 
the expected level of government spending cannotg: is bounded from below by zero; 
3·An equivalent assumption for the purposes of this analysi~ is that other 
revenue sources are inelastically supplied in some amount T and that the utility 
function (2.1) is of the form: 
iy io -
log C t + B log ct + l + eit (T + Gt) 
Alternatively, the utility function could incorporate deadweight losses from 
other sources of tax revenue as well as the benefits from government spending. 
10 
be negative. 
Domestic money market equilibrium obtains when 
(3.7) 
Taking the first difference of the logarithm of this expression, assuming 
stationarity or ~hat At• At- 1, yields 
. p - p 
(3.8)t t - 1 • m· - Ii .. gMt - n + atuet____ - un 
pt - 1 t t t 
The left hand side of (3.8) approximates the domestic inflation rate nt while 
PPP implies 
e P P* 
ut • ut - ut (3.9) 
Assuming th3t individuals know the parameters of the actual inflation 
process equations (3.8) and (3.9) imply that 
(3.10) 
p n P* .:.1, 
ut - - Cut+ atut) (1 - at) (3.11) 
e n P* -1 
ut - - Cut+ ut) (1 - at) (3.12) 
Therefore, as of period t 
.. ., .. .. 
ap 
2 
• Ca ' +a ~ +la .~) (1 - at+ 1>-~ (3.13)II t p 
2 2 2 -2 a • (a + a * )e II p (1 - at + 1> 
2 2 -2 
aep • (an +at+ lap*) (1 - at+ 1> 
* M 2 2Assuming that n, n, g,t o p * and __ on are sufficiently small to treat the 
product of any two of them as zero, expected seigniorage per worker can 
be approximated as 
• M 2 -2 2 2~[Gt]• Cl - lt _1) W[gt - at (1 - at) (on+ op*)] (3.14) 
vhere W= (1 - A) Y, per capita savings. 
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Substituting equations (3.10), (3.13) and (3.14) into equation (2.14) 
gives an expression for the expected utility of a worker in generation t 
as of period t-l as a function of exogenous and policy parameters. 
The next section derives policy parameters that maximize the expected 
utility of the average generation. Sections 5 and 6 consider the dynamic 
consistency of these policies. 
12. 
4. Fixed vs. Flexible Exchange Rates 
This sections considers a monetary response that is repeated each 
period, i.e., one such that 
(4.1) 
(4.2)• t - a Vt 
to derive policies that maximize the expected utility of each generation. 
When policy is of the form (4.1) and (4.2) the model under consideration 
is stationary. 
The share of foreign currency in total money balances is, from (2.13), 
(3.10), and (3.13). 
(4.3) 
The expected utility of seigniorage-financed government expenditure is 
M 2 -2 2 2




The expected utility of a member of any generation, where the expectation is 
taken as of any period before entry into the l~bor force, is, therefore 
MV • p + (1 + ~)Y - [ll* + (1 - >.) (g - n - Il*)] 
22 2 2 -"' - [ (1 - >.) a + (a - >.) a *] (1 - a) •·12
ll p 
. 
M 2 -2 2 2 (4.5)+ w(l - ).)W[g - a (1 - a) (o +a*)] 
. n P 
• M 
The values of g and a that maximize this expression, incorporating>. as 
defined by expression (4.3), constitute the optimal closed loop monetary 
.. 
1_3 
response. Analytic solutions for the general case were not obtained. 
It is nevertheless useful to consider instead three special cases: 
the non-monetary economy, the monetary economy with fixed exchange rates 
within the period, and a monetary economy with perfectly flexible rates: 
4.1 A Nonmoneta:y Economy 
From expression (4.3) observe that if 
gM > n + Il* + a t/(1 - a) (4.6). p 
then A •.l, i.e., domestic currency is not held at all. Seigniorage from 
domestic money creation is zero and foreign money is the only store of value. 
Expected utility is 
2t! .. p + Cl + a> y. - n* - 1/2 a • (4. 7)p 
4.2 Fixed Exchc.nge Rates 
When a c - • individuals will hold only domestic currency if g M - n<Il* 
and only foreign currency if gM - n>Il*. The eecond case yields the nonmonetary 
economy. If gM-n=ll* individuals are indifferent between the two currencies. 
For concreteness, assume that A• 0 in this c2se. When g 
M 
~n + ll*, then, 
expected utility is given by 
(4.8) 
M . Mand when g > n + Il* by Therefore if wW>l it is optimal to set g • ll* + n 
while if wU<l, to set g M • O. In the first case expected utility is 
2 2 2J!' • P +(1 + 6)y - Il* - a * /2 + wW[Il* + n - (a + a * )] (4.8')f n p 
while in the second it is 
2 · 2-~· - 2v-· • p + (1 + B) y + n - op* /2 wW(a +a*) (4.8'')n p 
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Comparing (4.8") and (4.8") with (4.7), expected utility in a nonmonetary 
economy, note that a nonmonetary economy domin?tes a monetary economy with fixed 
exchange rates if and only if 
1. Ci>W>l and 
2 - 2 (4. 9)a +a* > Il* + n n P 
or 
2. Ci>W<l and 
2 2 
wW(a + a *) > Il* + n
D p 
The only cost to establishing a currency with iixed rates relative to a no 
currency situation is the variability in seign~orage. This cost increases 
with the variance of the foreign price leveland the domestic growth rate. 
The benefit is the ability either to earn seigniorage on domestic currency or 
else to establish the Golden Rule interest rate. Either benefit increases with 
the term Il* + n, or the difference between the world interest rate (-Il*) and the 
domestic growth rate. 
4.3 Flexible Exchange ~tes 
When a• 0 individuals will hold foreign currency in proportion 
(4.10)1 • min {max {o, (l c- ; - n•~ -1- er/] , 1J_ 
o + a · 
11 p* 
Maintaining a monetary economy requires that 
M * 2 (4.11)g <n+n +a. p 
while if 
M * 2 (4.12)a < n + n -a 
D. 
no foreign currency will be held. 
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Assuming an interior solution for A, average utility is 
2~ • P + (1 + S)y - (gM - n) - 1/2 a . n 
M 2 
n + Il* - g +a* p
2 2 (4.13)
a +a*n p 
The optimal monetary growth rate maximizes expression (4.13) subject to the 
constraints (4.11), (4.12) and gM'!_O. The second-order condition for a 
maximum is satisfied, however, if and only if wW>l. 
In view of this complication it is consid~rably simpler to focus on twv 
particular special cases, one in which seigniorage effects are negligible (~W=O), 
· and one in which they are paramount (wW=m). E~ch is treated in turn. 
4.2.1 Absence of Seigniorage Effects 
When no social welfare derives from seigniorage maximum. average utility 
M ~ 2 2obtains when g = 0 and, if n + Il~>:1 , A = O, while if n + ll*<a -n n 
, . an2 - n - Il* 
A .,; ......._2,,__---.-2-. In the first case average utility is 
- a ··+ an p* 
tr--• p + (1 + S)y + n - 1/2 a 2 (4.13')n 
while in the second it is 
(a - n - Il*)r• 2 n 
2· 2 
U • p + (1 + S)y + n - 1/2 a + (4.13"), 2n 2(o .. + a .* )
n P 
Comparing expressions (4.13') and (4.13") with (4.7) note that a monetary economy 
2with pure floating dominates a nonmonetary economy when n + Il* and a* are 
p 
2large relative to~ • n 
16 
The greater the domestic growth rate relative to the foreign inflation rate 
the higher is the increase in the rate of return from establishing a domestic 
a • 2 2 currency. When is large relative to a the return on domestic money 
p n 
under floating rates will be relatively less risky. 
The desirability of fixing the exchange rate or allowing it to float 
can be determined by comparing expressions (4.13') and (4.13") with 
expression (4. 8") evaluated at Cll • 0. The condition for -fixed rates to 
dominate is : 
2
1. D + ll*>a and 
D 
a 2>a 2 (4.14) 
D p 
or 
22. II+ ll * <a 
D 
!!!!!. 
* 2 2 * 4 (n+n) - 2a (n + n) + a <OII p 
When a 2 ... 0 floating rates necessarily dominate while if a ~
2- O· fixed rates do. 
D 
2 2 p * 
When a 
2 • a n a the choice is a matter of indifference if n + n >a but if 
D p
* 2, . 
11 + n <a flexible rates are preferable. The reason is that, in this second 
case, the portfclio is diversified wider flexible rates, rates 
allow a reductic,n in risk. 
4.2.2 Dominance of Seigniorage Effects 
To analyee the situation in which earning seigniorage is of paramount 
concern set w • .,_ From expression (4.13) observe that seigniorage is at a. 
maximum when 
2M * (4.15)1 • (n + n + ap*)/2 
if A>. Oat this ,•alue which requires, in turn, that 
. 
* 2 2 (4.16)(n + n - a* )/2 <a p D 
17 
In this case earnings from seigniorage, denoted S, are 
* 2 2 
(n + n + a *)s - _______p_ w (4.17) 
If 1 • 0 at the value of g 
M given by (4.15) then the monetary authority can 
aet 
M * 2 g • n + n -a (4.18)
11 
and earn ' 
* 2S • (n + n _-- a ) W (4.19)
11 
Since both (4.17) and (4.19) are positive, while in a nonmonetary economy 
· seigniorage is zero, when seigniorage dominates the welfare function a monet.ary 
policy with flexible rates always yields higher. expected utility than a non-· 
monetary economy. 
Under fixed rates seigniorage earnings :ir,? stochastic because of the need 
to intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the currency. n,e 
appropriate comparison then, is between expect?d seigniorage under 
the two regimes. Normalizing (4.8) by dividing through by~ note that maxi~um 
expected seigniorage under fixed rates as w goes to infinity is 
E(S) s [Il* + n - (a· 2 +a*2)]W {4.20) n p 
By comparing (4.20) with (4.17) and (4.11) it can be shown that maximum 
expected seigniorage is necessarily higher under perfectly flexible exchange 
rates. When rates are perfectly flexible disturbances in the foreign price 
level affect neither the domestic price level nor the amount of money creation. 
They consequently do not affect real per capita seigniorage. Disturbances in 
the domestic population growth rate create domestic price level disturbances 
in the opposite direction. The two cancel each other to the point where, as a 
18 
first-order approximation real seignorage per capita is non-stochastic. 
When exchange rates are fixed, however, variation in the domestic price 
level and population growth rate are no longer perfectly negatively 
correlated. As a consequence of Jensen's inequality, expected real 
seignorage per capita is lower. This effect is not offset by the fact 
that under fixed rates more money ~an be created, on average, without 
leading to substitution into the foreign currency. Under fixed rates 
MA• 0 whenever g < n + Il* while under flexible rates A= 0 requires 
M 2 
g ~ n + Il* - a n 
.. . . . 
19 
S. Optimal Feedback and Closed Loop Policies 
The last section compared expected utility in a situation in which the 
monetary authority pegs the exchange rate each period with o~e in which it 
sets the money supply independently of the exchange rate. It was assumed that 
the monetary authority could precommit itself to a monetary response that 
maximizes the expected utility of each generation. 
The monetary authority may, however, respond only to the wishes of 
generations present at the time the monetary policy is implemented. At this 
point the money holdings of the old generation are a bygone, while the demand 
,for money of the young generation depends upon its expectations of policy in a 
later period. If current policy has no effect on expectations of future policy 
the monetary authority will establish a level of monetary growth each period 
taking as given ~onetary policies in other periods and existing asset 
hold~gs. 
In period t, then, the authority selects itM and at to maximize a weighted 
average of the old and young generation's .utillty. Let a denote the weight 
assigned to the young generation's utility a1.1d 1-a the weight to the old 
generation's utility. 
Tne component of the expected utility of ~he old. generation that is a 
function of policy in period tis 
o * M·Ut • -[n + (1 - At_ 1> (gt - n R*)] 
(5.1)-[Cl - At - 1>2 an2 + (at - At - 1>2 ap*2] (1 - at) :..2/2 




A time consistent policy is a choice of gtM and at that maximizes 
au;+ (1 - a)u;. 
When seigniorage earnings "do not affect utility (w • 0) the young 
generation is unaffected by current policy. Situations in which seigniorage 
effects are absent (w • O) and in which the old generation dominates the 
social welfare function (a• O) thus imply equivalent welfare criteria. 
Similarly, equivalent welfare criteria emerge when seigniorage effects are 
paramount c~ ••)and when the young generation dominates the social 
welfare function (a• 1). 
One result of this section is that when the young generation dominates 
the social welfare function or when seigniorage dominates the individual 
utility function (i.e., when a• 1 when or w ••)then time consistent (or 
optimal feedback) policy cannot sustain a monetary economy. The consequent 
equilibrium is in general inferior to the optimum that would emerge if the 
monetary authority could precommit itself to an alternative policy (i.e., 
to choosing the optimal closed loop policy). A second result is that when 
the old generation dominates the social welfare function or when seigniorag~
. . . . . ~ 
does not appear in the individual utility function (i.e., when a• 0 or w • 0) 
then time consistent policy may also yield a nonmonetary economy or it may yf.eld 
the optimal closed loop policy. 
5.1 Dominance of Seigniorage Effects or Young Generation Dominant 
For the case in which a• 1 or w • • this result is straightforward. 
Mis maximized when g ••and a • 0. Given~ 
1 
, the higher the monetaty . t t t -
growth rate the more revenue from seigniorage while exchange market interver.tion 
reduces expected seigniorage revenue. 
When the policy parameters assume these values the rate of return on 
domestic currency is Jninus infinity. Wealthholders, anticipating in the previous 
21 
period that these policies will be pursued will set At_ 1 • 1. Hence, 
in a rational expectations equilibrium, no seigniorage is collected. The 
economy degenerates to a nonmonetary economy with expected utility per 
generation Tl given by expression (4.7). 
5.2 Absence of Seigniorage Effect or Old Generation Dominant 
Somewhat more surprisingly, this same result can emerge when a• 1 or 
...ra, • O. u0 is maximized when
t-
M 
gt .. 0 (5.3) 
(5.4) 
Individuals, anticipating that this policy will be implemented in period t when 
selecting their portfolios in period t - 1, will, from equation (4.3), choose 
(5.5) 
This equation hes two solutions, At_ • 1, in which case at• 1, and At_ = 0,1 1 
·in which case a • - an2la *~ 
. . . . . . 1 . p 
The first equilibrium, once again, constitutes a degeneration to a non-
monetary equilitrium with expected average utility~- The second implies an 
expected average utility. 
2 2 2 1*2U • P + (1 + B)y + n - a a .L (a + a )- /2n P" n p 
The policy of setting 
M 
g - 0 (5.6) 
(5. 7) 
a1so constitutes an optimal closed loop policy when· seigniorage effects 
absent (111 • o). To see· .this observe that the derivative of exp·ected average 
utility.with respect to a, evaluated at the point g 
M 




is, from expression (4.5), 
dU (n + Il*) d>. (5.8)da da 
d).
Since at this point).• 0, -- o. Hence the first-order condition for a timeda 
consistent policy also corresponds to the first-order condition for an optimal 
policy when w • O. Since the second-order connitions for a maxi.mum are satisfied, 
this time consistent equilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium that emerges 
when w a O and the optimal closed loop policy is pursued. 
An ihtuitive explanation for the optimality of this equilibrium is that the 
larger the share of domestic currency in portfolios, the closer are the expected 
domestic interest rate facing consumers and the expected growth rate. A lower value c 
A_ thus brings the economy closer to the Golden Rule, thereby raising welfare. 
The optimal value of a should therefore be chose~ to minimize>.. In fact, 
when policy takes the form of (5.6) and (5.7), >.-= O, its minimum possible 
value. Optimal exchange rate management by th~ monetary authority thus provides 
a perfect substitute for currency diversification by private individuals as a 
means of minimizing risk. In other words, whea the exchange rate is managed 
optimally private-individuals have no incentiv~ to hold foreign currency'to 
risk associated with domestic currency each peciod leads them to stabilize the 
exchange rate in an optimal way. 
5.3 Extension to the General Case 
The conclusions of sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggest some results that would 
emerge if a and w assume intermediate values. 
first, for values of a and w sufficiently low, a monetary economy can be 
eustained by time consistent policies. Second, the level of monetary growth 
will be higher and the amount of intervention-lower than in the 
case when a• w • o. The reason is that to earn seigniorage it is necessary to 
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Mset g >O. Reducing a, the amount of intervention, will also raiset 
expected revenue from seigniorage. 
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6. The Role of Reputation in Enforcing a Monetary Economy 
A conclusion of the previous section is that when earning seigniorage 
is the predominant concern of the monetary authority, or that when the 
utility of the young generation dominates the social welfare function, 
then a time consistent policy cannot sustain a monetary equilibrium. It 
was assumed that the only objective of the mon_etary authority is to maximize 
a weighted average of the expected utilities of gen~ration·s currently present. 
An alternative objective is to maximize a weighted average of the expected 
utilities of current and all future generations. A reason for the monetary 
authority to take into account the welfare of future generations is that their 
welfare constitutes a public good to current generations, i.e., the utility of 
future generatio~s as a group affects the welfare of the current generations, 
but no atomistic member of the current generation has an incentive to provide 
a bequest to any member of the subsequent generation. In this context the 
monetary authority's incentive to maintain the reputation of its currency to 
~low future generations to earn seigniorage can lead to the time consistency 
of a 1n0netary economy. ·. 
Let the expected utility from seigniorage of a generation born at time t 
be given by 
-2 2 2 -
a) (a + a *)],U} (6.1)t n p 
An upper bound -U is placed on the welfare that can be generated from seigniorage 
to insure boundeciness of the overall objective function. 




Mwhere 6 constitutes a discount factor. Taking future policies g't, a't !!!. given, 
, > t,Wt is at a maximum when at• O and 
(6.3) 
Denote this policy as the optimal one-period policy. 
At some initial period t the monetary au~hority announces the policy
0 
response henceforth, denoted by the paramers ge, i, t > t • If the monetary
t - 0 
authority deviates from the policy it announces in some period t, individuals 
M * will anticipate that for VT>t, g -= g , a • O, i.e.·, that the optimal oneV 't 't 't 
period policy will be pursued. Let Ube sufficiently high to imply 
- * 2U/W > n + n + ap* (6.4) 
which from expre.ssion (4.3), insures that when individuals anticipate ·the optimal 
one~period policy in period t they will select ~T _ • 1, i.e., hold no domestic1 
~urrency• 
.If the autt.ority deviates from its annoUIJ.ced policy in period t, assuming 
that l . l < 1,it can.attain a level of its objective function U in that periodt - . 
and zero subsequently, since henceforth A-= 1. The economy degenerates to a 
nonmonetary economy. Thus the value of deviating from the announcement in any 
period tis simply U. 
By stickL~g with its announced policy in period t, assuming that this policy 
-was anticipated in period t-1 . and that the announced policy will be adhered to 
aubsequently, the authority can attain a level of its objective function 
(6.5) 
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where A t-l :. is predetermined and l't_1 , 
't > t, 1s given by 
2 2Cf -· n - II*) (1 - I ) + an + a·'ta .2] }
1 • min max O, I I P ' 1 (6. 6)1'-1 { [ 2 2 a +a* . u p 
The time consistencyof the announced policy requires that w8' > U\jt > t . that 
t - - O' 
is, the value to the monetary authority of adhering to the announced policy, 
and thereby maintaining the expectation that it will continue to adhere to 
this policy,must exceed the maximum value of reverting to the optimal one-period 
policy. 
The optimal credible policy is a choice of g, I in the initial period
t t . 
t . that maximizes w8 subject to the constraints w8 > uYt > t • For . t > t 
0 t t- -o 0 . . o . a 
the first-~rder conditions for a maximum of Wt are the same as those for 
the unconstrained optimal closed loop policy. Since these first-order con-




t > t. Denote 
0 
(6.7) 
-If W> (1 - 6) U then the optimal credible policy in period t and the uncon-
o. ----
•trained optimal closed loop policy coincide. If W < (1 - ~)Uthe unconstrained 
optimal closed loop policy is not sust~inable by a time consistent policy. For 
t > t 0 the economy degenerates to a nonmoneta~, economy. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has analysed exchange rate management into very simple 
overlapping generations model. The purpose has been to evaluate monetary 
policy in an open economy on the basis of its implications for the welfare 
of individuals in the economy. While this paper has introduced a micro­
economic framework for analysing monetary policy, it has done so at the 
expense of omitting a number of important features of ope~ economies that 
have received attention elsewhere. For example, in this model government 
debt provides the only store of value. There is no productive capital and 
no distinction Letween assets that are held a~ stores of value and for 
transactions purposes. The implications of policy for output and employment 
are not considered. The lack of a consensus ~bout the microeconomic causes 
of these phenomena makes their incorporation into an analysis of this sort 
difficult. 
The analys1s in this paper identifies two objectives of monetary policy: 
to provide a desirable store of va~ue, i.e., one with a high and stable rate 
of ~etuI11~ and co collect a high and stable auount of seigniorage. Despite 
the difference in approach between this and other studies some similar results 
emerge. In par-;;icular, a policy of pure floating is likely to be more 
when domestic supply is highly variable relati.ve to the foreign price level and 
converesly. In addition, the benefits of havi.ng a national currency at all 
diminish when the foreign inflation rate is low and stable. 
While having a national currency may be desirable from a national welfare 
perspective, ti11e consistent policy on the part of the monetary authority may 
be unable to sustain a currency. This result is most likely to emerge wher. the 
primary concern c-f the monetary authority is the extraction of seigniorage (as 
when· its major constitue.ncy is the young •· geueration) and when it is unable to 
-, . ·- -· --- -
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adevelop a reputation (as when the monetary authority is not perceived as 
continuous, infinitely-lived organization). The fact that seigniorage pro­
vides a major source of revenue in some countries suggests why these are also 
countries that must institute exchange controls: the police power of the state 
is used to maintain the viability of domestic currency faced with competition 
from foreign currencies. When seig?iorage provides the least distortionary 
source of government revenue at the margin, such policies may be optimal. 
This paper has considered government liabilities that take the form of 
currency. Introducing a coupon on this liability would not affect the analysis. 
Hence the model applies to government borrowing generally rather than simply to 
monetary issue. Introducing a distinction between monetary and non-monetary 
debt would require introducing a transactions motive for holding money. This 
aspect of the microfowidations of exchange ratu management has been explored 
~y Stockman (1980) and Helpman (1981). An integration of the portfolio con­
siderations exami:l.ed here and the transactions motives treated in this other 
literature constitutes an importan~ topic for future research. 
29 
References 
Buiter, W.H. (1979), "Optimal Foreign Exchange Market Intervention with
Rational Expectations," in J. Martin and A. Smith, editors, Tradeand Payments under Flexible Exchange Rates, (London: MacMillan). 
Buiter, W.H. and J. Eaton (1980), "Policy Decentralization and Exchange
Rate Management in Interdependent Economies," NBER Working Paper
No. 531. 
Calvo, G.A. (197d), "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetaty
Economy," Econometrica, 46, 1411-1428•. 
Eaton, J. and S.j. Tumovsky (1980), "The Forward Exchange Market, Speculation.and Exchange Market Intervention," Australian National University
Working Paper No. 033. 
Fischer, S. (1982), "Seigniorage and the Case for a National Money," Journal
of Polit!cal Economy, 90, 295-313. 
Flood, R. and N.P. Marion (1982), "The Transmission of Disturbances UnderAlternative Exchange Rate Regimes with Optimal Indexing,"
Quarterly Journal of Economica, 97, 43-66. 
Frenkel, J. and J. Aizenman (1981), "Aspects of the Optimal Management of
Exchange Rates" NBER Working Paper No. 748. 
Belpman, E., ">.n Exploration in the Theory of ·Exchange-Rate Regimes," Journalof Political Economy, 89, 865-890. 
ICydland, F.E. (1977), "Equilibrium Solutions in Dynamic Dominant-Player
Models," Journal .of Economic Theory, 15 (2), 307-324. 
ICydland, F~E. an,l .E.C. Prescott (1977), "Rules Rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans/' Journal of Political Economv. 85>
473-491. 
Lucas, R.E. (1976), "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in K. Bru~nerand A.H. Meltzer, editors, The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series. 
Samuelson, P.A. (1958), "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With orWithout the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Ecunomv,66, 467-~82. 
Stockman, A.C. (1980), "A Theory of Exchange Rate Determination" Journal of
Political Economy, 88, 673-698. 
turnovsky, S.J. (1982), "Exchange Market Intervention Policies in a Small
Open Econcmy," in J. Bhandari and B. Putnam, editors, The InternationalTransmisslon of Economic Disturbances, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press)• 
